British Strategy Part 1

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This article is the first part of a dissertation originally submitted to King's College in London by Ewan B. Carmichael. It portrays the strategic issues of the Seven Years' War from the British point of view.

Part 1 - Introduction and Background

Clausewitz wrote that war has a dynamic all of its own, recognizing that the combatants become engaged in a struggle in which passion, friction and chance all play a role.1 The outcome is far from predictable and one of Clausewitz's most important insights about war's nature is that it is a reciprocal activity, and that a dynamic is created simply by the very act of participating.2

The Seven Years' War (SYW) spanned the globe, to the extent that it has frequently been described as the 'first World War'. It was fought between most of the then great powers, European protagonists, on land and at sea, in North America, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, Western Europe, Central Europe, India and Africa. While the scale of the wars against Louis XIV and against Napoleon may have overshadowed the SYW, those were arguably reflections of a traditionally balanced status quo.3 The importance of the SYW was its cause of permanent change in the geo-political limits of European politics, expanding to embrace global politics.

The commonly recognized dates of the SYW are that it began on 17 May 1756, with the declaration of war between France and Britain, and ended on 15 February 1763 when Saxony sued for peace with Prussia. However, the causes were rooted in the outcomes of previous wars, and there was a slide to conflict over colonial trade, most noticeably in North America and India. A further factor was readjustment of protective alliances. The new alliance between Britain and Prussia did not endure the conflict. By the end of the SYW, Prussia was the dominant power in the Germanies, Russia likewise in Eastern Europe, while Britain's place as a maritime imperial power was confirmed. However, the war had sapped much of the energy of the protagonists and various commentators have suggested that the seeds of the American Revolution had been sown through the requirement to pay for the defence of the American colonies by taxation. Furthermore, the conditions left by the SYW in France may have contributed to the French Revolution.

The aim of this essay will be to review whether, in the face the dynamics of the SYW, British war leaders had a strategy and, if so, whether they were able to review and adjust it to suit changing circumstances. When did leaders recognise that their situation had changed and what did they actually do about it? Could strategy absorb short-term issues without adjustment, or was change necessary?

This essay opens with some scene-setting, examining Britain's situation and self-view prior to the SYW. It will consider the years leading to the formal start of hostilities and whether Britain was a willing participant in the war, or whether she was drawn in to protect her trading surrogates. The peculiar issue for Britain of Hanover may be relevant. Next, it will provide a narrative of the years 1754 to 1763 as Anglo-French hostilities ignited and then Frederick the Great's ambitions drew both Britain and France from their colonial concerns into war in Western Europe (1754 is used in this essay as the start point of the SYW, although Britain actually declared war on 17 May 1756, while Frederick invaded Saxony on 29 August 1756). As the narrative encompasses the globe it will occasionally move forward and back chronologically in order to describe the regional situation. An important element of the narrative is the differing views of possible peace terms. The paper then discusses the aftermath of the war before providing a review and a conclusion.

Setting the scene and working definitions

Grand strategy might be described as marshalling large means in pursuit of medium to long-term ends: a 'course of action that integrates ends, ways and means to meet policy objectives'.4 Identifying and articulating national interests and objectives is the key to this.

The master question assumes that Britain was a unit, with unified opinion and leadership. As this essay will show, that was not necessarily the case. Who did Britain's strategy 'belong' to? In the politics of the day, national policy might be shaped by the Ministry, a term taken to mean all the ministers of a government, including cabinet and junior ministers alike. The King chose his ministers, yet the Commons could deny them the funds they required. The post of Prime Minister was evolving. There were several incumbents during the course of the war, but strong characters in parliament, not necessarily in government, could sway both popular opinion and national policy. This mix was further complicated by perceptions of what 'the mob' would tolerate, and of what constituted 'Patriotism'. As this paper will show, these diverse perspectives made achieving a consistent view of interests and war aims difficult.

Events form an important component of this paper's narrative. Strategy must take account of events against time. It does not set aside the ideas that material power is important or that actors make instrumental calculations of their interests. What occurs is constructed by social processes and interactions.5 Was an event important or urgent enough, the two should not be confused, to require strategy to be adjusted? The key, of course would be to devise a strategy which was sufficiently durable.

In the modern narratives of some of the countries which provided theatres of the war, their portion of the SYW may have a name specific to the war conducted in that theatre (e.g. The French-Indian War of 1754-63 in North America, and the Third Carnatic War of 1757-63 on the Indian sub-Continent). To avoid confusion it should be noted that the dates of these theatre conflicts do not conform precisely to the core events of the common descriptor.

Occasionally the term 'Atlanticism' will be used which, for the purposes of this essay, is intended to capture a sense of British non-Continental (non-European) interests which might, by preference, focus on North America and Canada. There was considerable debate about Britain's identity. Her leaders and vociferous parts of her population were torn between an Atlanticist and a Continental identity.

'Patriotism' was a phenomenon particularly recognizable in Britain, understandably perhaps given her island separation and also ethnic and religious differences from the Continent. Commentators described the dominant moral traits of the English as violence and patriotism. The bellicose English hated the French, but they hated everyone else too, Clausewitz's 'hostile feelings'.6 Politically, Patriotism tended to be the stance of a group of disenchanted Whigs. It is probably difficult to translate 18th Century patriotism into a contemporary equivalent. Duffy describes most people's lives being limited by a spirit of campanilismo and of social divisions, but public interest and opinion were high.7

Prior to the war

British policy and positioning

Sir Edward Grey, Britain's longest-serving twentieth Century Foreign Secretary, is described by Otte as refuting all discussion of 'far-sighted views or large conceptions or great schemes' as guiding Britain's foreign relations.8 However, it would be inappropriate to assume an altogether random foreign policy-making process subject only to the short-term needs without some concept of grand strategic objectives. What were deemed as Britain's vital national interests?

Baugh suggests that 'the ultimate object of statesmen in London and Versailles was to maintain or increase security, power and influence in Europe', in short, they had identical core interests.9 Beyond this core, their interests were often opposed but directly related.

Churchill opined that for 400 years the foreign policy of England had been to oppose whatever was the strongest, most dominating power on the Continent. In the 18th Century, Europe was viewed as a tremendous field of forces, which were liable to become unstable unless they were held in equilibrium. The principle itself tended to come into operation of its own, being self-adjusting through the British policy of maintaining equilibrium by throwing her weight on the scale.10

An enduring aim of the policy of Great Britain was the preservation of the 'Liberties of Europe', which could only be protected by frustrating attempts by any Power, or group of Powers, to dominate Europe so that they could dictate to lesser states. The prime example of such a domineering force within Europe would be the Bourbon Alliance, which resulted in Britain necessarily making compacts and alliances in order to balance power. Balancing power was conducted as a means of self-preservation, and protecting the nation's vital interests, and not out of a spirit of altruism.11

Certain patterns emerge from study of Britain's past history of external relations. Otte suggests that at least four elements emerge of a foreign policy which helped to underpin Britain's international position. The first of Otte's elements is the use of armed force to project British power, not only to protect the Empire but also to contain, through blockade (or the threat of it), any Continental European power attempting to achieve hegemony. The second strand, both underwriting armed force but also contributing to 'hard power', is wealth or financial capacity. Today this has become a constraint, but in the 18th Century, Britain had distinct advantages through colonies and her trade. The third element of British global strategy is closely related, the potential to sustain a major war effort through mobilizing Imperial resources, including raw materials and manpower reserves. Closely linked to these 'hard power' elements is an important, component: alliances, and indeed wider diplomacy, during both peace and wartime. It was through diplomacy that alliances could be achieved with other powers, or groups of powers, in order to contain any power threatening Britain's communications links at sea, impinging on the independence of the Low Countries, which were of strategic relevance, or seeking Continental hegemony. This is the first indication that there was a complex relationship between Britain's extra-European interests and her European commitments.12

A consistently important enabler has been 'Sea Power'. Richmond draws on Mahan in describing sea power as embracing 'all that tends to make a people great upon or by the sea'.13 Sea power comes not only from possessing a fighting navy, but results also from a suitable geographical situation and a character that makes for trade and for colonisation. The impulse to trade by sea is vital, and Richmond describes it as the 'prime foundation of sea-power, which grows and dies with it'.14 Foreign trade, and the wealth generated by it, would add to the ships, seamen and naval force of the nation. There was a complex but symbiotic relationship between naval strength, a mercantile marine, wealth for ship-building and paying for the seamen who supplied the fighting ships, and the transports which conveyed land forces around the globe. Furthermore sea-power provided the wealth which propped up the leagues and confederacies of previous monarchs, and which limited French ambitions. Commerce and the protection of the navy were mutually interdependent.

Richmond describes Britain's wars as falling into one of three broad categories. First, perhaps a reflection of the age in which he wrote, is small wars with 'weak or savage' (sic) powers which may not depend on maritime trade.15 Here land forces are dominant and control of the seas is not being competed for, so the active strategic role of the Navy in co-operation is clearly negligible.

The second type, Clausewitz's war of 'limited object', is where Britain, possibly as part of an alliance, comes into conflict with another power contesting ownership of land or maritime rights overseas.16 Here the naval role is in support of land forces in the disputed territory, protecting them from counterstroke, impeding enemy reinforcement, sustaining them and protecting them in transit. Both Corbett and Richmond suggest that it would not be normal to defeat a great power solely at sea.17 18 Richmond quotes Nelson who said it was to be, 'regretted that England could not decide the fate of Empires by action at sea'.19 In the SYW in North America the role of the Navy was securing maritime superiority to enable the British Army to reach the territory in dispute and then operate with minimal external interference from Brest. The fleet's strategic role lay in securing the line of communications of the Army, decision being accomplished on land.

Richmond's third group is of wars of coalitions, in which a group of Powers, including Britain, opposes another great group: what amounts to the world is at war. Lebow describes this as 'hegemonic war'.20 In such great conflicts the situation is different in that Britain cannot, and does not, predominate in the main theatre of operations. British forces constitute a fraction of the armies in that theatre. In such operations of Treaties of Alliance between Continental Powers, military strength on land may be roughly balanced. Britain's small land force contribution is sufficient only to contribute to that balance and is insufficient to alter the situation decisively. In the absence of decision, such conflicts tend to be protracted and generate great internal debate about the conduct of British strategy. Should Britain deploy an army to the Continent, perhaps as a subordinate part of a larger Continental army, with the Navy in a defensive role? Should Britain act as a maritime power, providing mobility to the Army and multiplying its size? Should Britain consummate her command at sea, using the Army as an amphibious force and depriving the enemy of maritime commerce and all the supplies which that would involve? This debate which could be described as that between supporters of Continental operations against the Maritime, or Atlanticist, school featured prominently during the SYW. In terms of Britain's involvement with Europe, the period 1740-1763 witnessed a high-water mark of her commitment to the Continent.21

At this time, William Pitt the Elder (1711-78), later the First Earl of Chatham, features significantly as a key figure in the development of British foreign policy. Pitt's role in the prioritisation of 'America or Europe?' debate is profoundly important, and the issue continues to resonate today, reflecting domestic political pressures.22

Pitt's stance in the face of political considerations was not always consistent. During the SYW he was one of the two Secretaries of State responsible for the conduct of foreign policy between December 1756 and April 1757, and between July 1757 and September 1761. For the remainder, Pitt was a severe critic of the government and of Britain's foreign policy.23 He frequently worked in concert with Newcastle and Hardwicke, whose characters complemented his: Newcastle, several times Prime Minister, was honest and subtle; Hardwicke was the best strategist in the Cabinet and played an intelligent support role.

The political considerations were not always fixed but, in general, Pitt could be viewed as an opponent of giving Europe priority and of the Royal role in formulating foreign policy.24 In Pitt's view ministers paid too much attention to George II's concerns, as both King and Elector of Hanover, but also to the possibility of constructing a system of European alliances both to protect Hanover but also to restrain the ambitions of other potential hegemons, most notably France.

Rather, Pitt and the 'Patriot' party offered a sense of national identity and national interest that was not expressed through or in the monarch, but was founded on the notion of Britain as a maritime power with an active trans-oceanic destiny. While such an identity and interest had been provided before, particularly in terms of literary rhetoric, with Pitt they were to assume a central role in the discussion of foreign policy.

Prelude to the Seven Years War

Not only were there armed clashes with the French in the years immediately preceding the commonly accepted date for the start of the SYW, but for the underlying causes of the war the reader must go back several decades. This next section lays an important foundation, explaining Britain's position and also showing the seeds of future conflict being sown as a result of the outcomes of previous ones. Clausewitz advised that defeated states frequently saw peace terms as being a transitory evil.25

William III's succession transformed Britain into a European power, both through his European connections and commitments, but also through his worldly wise Dutch entourage. As a result, English politicians were forced to become engaged in European matters. To an extent Britain's interests combined with Dutch interests, beginning to recognize the wider European picture, and coinciding with those of the King in defending the Liberty of Europe against France's hegemonial ambitions.26

Britain was the main beneficiary of the 1714 Peace of Utrecht which brought the War of the Spanish Succession to a conclusion and contained French ambitions through the re-erection of the Dutch 'Barrier', in which the Netherlands should be fortified at Austria's cost to keep the French out, the latter having been forced to destroy her defences and port in Dunkirk.27 Utrecht restored an emerging balance of power and also the principle of flexibility based on 'alliances and alignments'. Significantly for Britain, she was able to influence a new balance of power in the Mediterranean through newly acquired naval bases in Gibraltar and Minorca. Her navy was numerically and organizationally superior to potential European rivals, and it was boosted by a great number of merchantmen and privateers. Almost equally importantly, the Admiralty Board was able to organize and coordinate Britain's global ship movements through information provided by its 'intelligence system'. Furthermore, information gathering on the Stuart Pretender on the Continent gave impetus to the improved institutionalization of a diplomatic service. The economy played its part too. Import duties and indirect taxation financed Britain's rise to great power status on the back of the military successes. On the other hand, national debt rose substantially. It was as a result of war that Britain changed from a largely free-trade country to a de facto protectionist one.28

Britain's connections and commitments to the Continent were further reinforced by the Hanoverian accession in 1714. The new King's German interests produced a shift in Britain's European diplomacy.

The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) transformed Britain's international position and marked a period characterised by instability in European affairs. Britain's relationship with Europe became complicated by the ensuing Austro-Prussian struggle for mastery of the Continent and the rise of Frederick the Great.29 Regardless of which side won, the victor would have to become the effective guarantor of Hanover. Hanoverian interests were not pro-Prussian and Britain joined the conflict on Austria's side principally to counter France. Pitt, in opposition, was convinced that such intervention served Hanoverian rather than British interests. In the Commons, on 10 December 1742, Pitt attacked what he claimed were unnecessary alliances and engagement in Continental quarrels, criticizing George II for being most interested in aggrandizing Hanover.30 Pitt's remarks constituted both a willingness to defend national interests and a powerful attack on George's conduct. Pitt's own firm convictions and potent assertion of national rights commanded popular support and throughout his political career he expressed these in parliament. At a time of intense and rising patriotism, Pitt defined loyalty through the furtherance of national interests rather than arising from Royal initiatives and decreasingly on the defence of the Protestant Succession.31

However, in February 1746 Pitt's acerbic criticism of Hanoverian influence stopped when he joined the Government, as Joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland and then as Paymaster General. He found himself unable to direct government policy and yet having to defend it to the House. As the War of the Austrian Succession progressed, and until its end in 1748, Britain was able to return to a well-worn theme, the defence of the Low Countries.32

The results of the war of the Austrian Succession for France had been that her navy had not only been heavily attrited but, even more importantly, its morale had been badly damaged. She had lost over 1,000 merchant ships and her trading companies had suffered grievously. The net effect of the war which preceded the SYW was to erode the French line of communications with India through both the loss of such a great part of her fleet, but also the weakening of her trade.33

The 1748 peace of Aix-La-Chapelle left one particularly unresolved and unacceptable issue: Louisbourg in Canada, which Britain gave back to France in return for a French withdrawal from the Low Countries. It arose because Lord Newcastle, as the new Northern Secretary, had other pressing concerns: there was anxiety about the Bourbon axis between France and Spain; Britain could overmatch France alone in North America and at sea, but France and Spain combined could draw on Spain's extensive colonies and the preponderance would be reversed. Newcastle was acutely aware that 'the' priority of British foreign policy was to prevent France from having any naval outlet to the North Sea.34

However Austria was showing disinterest in the arrangement, with the consequent risk that Holland might seek protection from either France or Prussia. A war started by Britain risked driving Holland into the arms of the French, providing Britain's longest standing enemy with several naval bases. Lastly, possibly preying on Newcastle's mind might have been an alliance between France and Prussia dating from 1741 when France agreed to finance 20,000 German troops. That treaty was now due for renewal, and relations between both courts seemed warm. Britain's grave concern lay in Hanover's extreme vulnerability to France. Should Britain be distracted elsewhere, Hanoverian resistance to a far stronger France could quickly crumble unless her neutrality could be assured. In terms of honour, this would be unacceptable as, whilst not actually a British dominion, she did belong to Britain's King. Further, Hanover did play a part in blocking possession of another stretch of the Continental coast to rivals.35

In opposition Pitt had objected to subsidizing foreign troops yet now, rather than furthering secret goals, they were clearly designed to protect British security via the Low Countries. The traditional non-interventionist agenda seemed less relevant, and Pitt's move into government can be related to this shift. Pitt continued to play an active role in refuting opposition criticisms that national interests were being ignored.36 It is perhaps understandable that charges of hypocrisy were levelled at Pitt, but showed a flexibility that reflected a response to domestic and foreign circumstances. Even when he had a solid parliamentary majority, Pitt did not evade the unpleasant challenge of explaining the limits of national power. Pitt moved into opposition in 1754, passed over in the ministerial reshuffle, just as Anglo-French relations deteriorated.

King George II was something of an armchair general.37 Out of nervousness for a potential French or Prussian (at that time an ally of France) attack on Hanover, George II attempted to build subsidy-alliances with Hesse-Cassel and Russia. According to Black the Duke of Newcastle met Pitt and was able to report:

'There was such a firm resolution, so solemnly declared, both as to persons, and things; that, if complied with, must produce a total change of the present system, both as to measures and men.38
'Pitt said that, if it was expected, that he should take an active part, in support of measures, he must be enabled to do it; which he could not think, the calling him to the Cabinet Council, would, in any degree, do. That the House of Commons was now an assembly of atoms; that the great wheels of the machine were stop'd that this could not be thought sufficient to put them in motion & that I did not know the state of the House of Commons; which he might say without vanity, he did, better than anybody & that the business of the House of Commons could not go on, without there was a minister (a subordinate one perhaps) which should go directly between the King and them & that he could not, and would not, take an active part in the House of Commons, without he had an office of advice, as well as of execution;...if he could be induced to part with some part of my sole power; to that I replied, that I know of no such sole power; that my present situation was not my choice, but the King's command'.39

Pitt's view of the proposed treaty with Russia was that in time of peace it might be approved as a way of preserving that peace, but that, at that time, it was actually in danger of creating a system so disadvantageous to British interests that it risked alienating the Royal family in the eyes of the people. Newcastle thought it necessary to be prepared to defend Hanover but that such defence ought to be independent of other Continental considerations. Pitt, recognising the impossibility of this, disagreed, stressing that the British people would resent the consequences of any war entered into on Hanover's account, with dire consequences for the monarchy. Pitt's view was that, rather than indemnify Hanover in advance, it would be preferable to make good any harm done as a result of a brief occupation of Hanover by a foreign Power. Pitt would not back any subsidy treaty with Russia if it would later hinder Britain's ability to fight France. George II did not want Pitt as Secretary and there was no possibility of an agreement on these terms. Consequently Pitt was passed over for a Secretaryship of State.40

As British commerce expanded, trading stations sprang up which evolved into colonies. The relationship between such settlements and the Navy was symbiotic: the settlements relied on the Navy to contribute towards their security, but the Navy also depended upon the settlements. Ships were not self-supporting: they required to refresh, re-victual and replace other supplies; they required secure harbours and bases in which they could refit. As trading stations and settlements developed into colonies, they also contributed to greater sea-power through the development of both trade of their own and of a seafaring population.41

Whenever settlements remained underdeveloped, possibly isolated and having a proportion of a small population capable of defending itself, such colonies were vulnerable to attack by relatively small forces. On the other hand, those colonies with guaranteed reinforcement could defend themselves and even expand aggressively. Such reinforcement could only come from the parent country, so sea-power provided the means to secure and maintain the maritime link with the mother country. It was due to sea-power that Britain, with strong maritime forces, when conflict escalated, was able to maintain local superiority in the face of French efforts.42

Further, it prepared the ground work, providing Britain strong foundations in other parts through trade. British East India trade predated French ingress and encroachment. Unlike the French who were hampered by Royal interference, the relatively unregulated British trade had fostered a scale which gave her a marked advantage later when competition escalated into armed struggle. Britain had more colonies and a larger volume of shipping, both of which provided a competitive advantage, and all this stemmed from a trading impulse.43

In the intervening, ostensibly peaceful years, competition continued in India and North America. In India, Dupleix caused tensions which interfered with trade, but he also withheld bad news, so he was recalled to France. In North America, collisions between the French and colonial levies over disputed frontiers resulted in frank combat. During the several years' truce, France had set about attempting to restore some of her sea-power. However, although her trade had revived, the British Navy still had double the number of her warships and an even greater actual superiority in terms of experience and understanding of naval operations. Actual operations had filtered out the less able commanders and all these factors gave Britain a preponderance which could not be matched through mere shipbuilding. The combination of strength and ability was to prove particularly potent.44

Kennedy suggests that the term 'truce' is a misnomer in describing the situation in North America as the colonists were virtually uncontrollable by government in the homeland, particularly when egged on by the assertions of the 'Patriot' element in Britain that a struggle for global dominance was afoot.45 Both countries had skirmished in their colonies for years without a state of war existing. Previous clashes with the French in North America had seemed like inconsequential localised squabbles. Britain had had her share of comparative successes and failures but there was no marked change. The difference now was in outlook and vocabulary. Furthermore, the full weight of sea-power could tip the balance beyond limited localised collisions.

In America, the dispute matured as the French tried to impose order in the area between the South shore of Lake Erie and the Ohio's headwaters, an area sought by both Britain and France. Duquesne came out as Governor with instructions to expel the British from the disputed zone. In doing so, he drove out or imprisoned traders from the English Ohio Company. They had been sent by Company shareholders, influential businessmen of Maryland and Virginia with a concession from the British Crown.46 The clash was inevitable. A small command under Colonel G. Washington was obliged to surrender at Fort Duqesne. Although no-one yet realised it, the SYW had started.

Foot notes

1. C.P.G. von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87, 122 and 149.

2. H. Strachan and A. Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the 21st Century (New York: 2007), 30.

3. F.A.J. Szabo, The Seven Years War in Europe 1756-1763 (Harlow: Pearson, 2008), 433-434.

4. RCDS Handbook, Thinking Strategically (Shrivenham: British Crown Copyright, 2010), 8.

5. I. Hurd in C. Reus-Smit and D. Snidal, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 312.

6. Clausewitz, op cit., 138.

7. C. Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London: Wordsworth, 1998), 7-9.

8. T.G. Otte (ed.), The Makers of British Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 2.

9. D. Baugh, The Global Seven Years War 1754-1763 (Longman: Harlow, 2011), 1.

10. I.L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random, 1965), 43-47.

11. Otte, op cit., 3-4.

12. Otte, op cit., 2-3.

13. H.W. Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength (London: Longman's, 1928), 161-166.

14. idem.

15. ibid, 32-33.

16. Clausewitz, op cit., 601-616.

17. A. Gat, A History of Military Thought (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 485.

18. Richmond, op cit., 33-36.

19. idem.

20. R.N. Lebow, Why Nations Fight (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 95-96.

21. J. Black, in Otte, op cit., 35- 51.

22. idem.

23. Baugh, op cit., 24-30.

24. C. Arnold-Baker, The Companion to British History (Tunbridge Wells: Longcross, 1996), 1009.

25. Clausewitz, op cit., 80.

26. Otte, op cit., 3-4.

27. B. Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat (London: Penguin, 2008), 68-69.

28. Otte, op cit., 4.

29. Simms, op cit., 279.

30. Black, op cit., 36.

31. Simms, op cit., 300-318.

32. Black, op cit., 37.

33. Richmond, op cit., 173.

34. F. Anderson, Crucible of War (London: Faber & Faber, 2000), 35-36.

35. J.S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War (London: Longmans, 1907), 26.

36. Black, op cit., 35- 51.

37. A.C. Thompson, George II (Padstow: Yale, 2011), 277.

38. Black, op cit., 38.

39. ibid., 35- 51.

40. Simms, op cit., 403-405.

41. Baugh, op cit., 3.

42. Richmond, op cit., 163.

43. Baugh, op cit., 66-71.

44. idem.

45. P. Kennedy, The Rise and fall of Great Powers (London: Harper Collins, 1989), 143.

46. Corbett, op cit., 14.


This article is a reproduction of the following work with the kind authorisation of its author:

  • Carmichael, E. B.: To what extent was Great Britain able to influence her strategy in the face of the events of the Seven Years' War?, dissertation for King's College, London, August 2012